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Regulation of Borderless High-Technology Economies:
Managing Spillover Effects
Steven R. Salbu*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In October of 1998, the European Union Data Privacy Directive ("Directive")
became effective.' Consistent with Europe's serious approach to consumer privacy,
the Directive mandates that Member States adopt the most rigorous privacy
legislation the world has seen. The specific requirements of the Directive are complex,
and I have discussed them in some detail in another article.' Very generally, the
Directive places obligations on data collectors and provides rights to data subjects.
The most significant of these protections from a global privacy perspective is the
Directives "opt-in" approach, which presumes an expectation of data privacy as the
default position, and (with certain exceptions) allows the processing of personal
information only if "the data subject has unambiguously given his consent.
Beyond this substantive provision, which differs from the "opt-out" presumption
that underlies US privacy policy, the Directive contains an interesting data-flow
restriction. Because of its potential effect on other nations that interact with or do
business in Europe, it may be the most controversial feature of the Directive.4
According to Article 25 of the Directive:
The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal
data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer
*
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European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 OJ (L 281) 31 (directive on "the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data") ("Directive").

2.

For a detailed discussion of the Directive's specific requirements, see Steven R. Salbu, The European
Union Data Privacy Directiveand InternationalRelations, VandJ Transnatl L (forthcoming 2002).

3.
4.

Directive at art 7(a)(cited in note 1).
In today's global market, entities in all nations are likely to interact or do business with Europe.
Accordingly, the Directive's provisions protecting data flows are likely to have worldwide impact.
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may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with national provisions
adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third country in
question ensures an adequate level of protection.
Section 2 of Article 25 enumerates circumstances that help determine whether
adequate protection is provided by a given third country. These include
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing
operation or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the
rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and
the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that
country.
Countries that fail to ensure adequate protection under the provisions of Article
25 may still receive personal data transfers under the following conditions:
1. By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where otherwise provided by
domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall provide that a transfer
or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an
adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2) may take place on
condition that:
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed
transfer; or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data
subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures
taken in response to the data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a
third party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest
grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is
intended to provide information to the public and which is open to
consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can
demonstrate legitimate interest, to the extent that the conitions laid down in
law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may authorize a transfer or a
set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an
adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2), where the
controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the privacy
and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the exercise of
the corresponding ights; such safeguards may in particular result from appropriate
contractual clauses.

5.
6.
7.

Directive at art 25 § 1 (cited in note 1).
Id at art 25 § 2.
Id at art 26.
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The Directive's data-flow restrictions recognize that European implementing
legislation must account for the use of data beyond the EU if it is to provide
meaningful consumer privacy protections. 8 The restrictions have thrown down the
gauntlet to the non-EU world: if nations are to ensure continued data flows from
much of Europe, they must prove that they are worthy of "Safe Harbor" protection by
demonstrating that they have ensured adequate data privacy.
The United States was the first nation to draft proposed Safe Harbor guidelines,
and to present them to the European Union for its approval. After several rounds of
negotiations, a final set of Safe Harbor provisions was drafted by the US and
approved by the European Union.9
The specifics of the Safe Harbor principles are beyond the scope of this article.
They are listed and briefly explained in the Federal Register, which also elaborates on
the principles through a set of frequently asked questions, or FAQs.' Very generally,
the principles allow US companies to self-certify as Safe Harbor compliant by
registering with the US Department of Commerce. According to the Commerce
Department's International Trade Administration,
EU organizations . . . can ensure that they are sending information to a U.S.
organization participating in the safe harbor by viewing the online list of safe harbor
organizations posted on the website. The list will contain the names of all U.S.
companies that have committed to the safe harbor framework. This list will be
regularly updated, so that it is clear who is assured of safe harbor benefits."
Others have written in detail about the US Safe Harbor provisions. 2 The brief
description above suffices to establish the context in which to examine an interesting
phenomenon: some observers believe that the US Safe Harbor principles are weak
and meaningless, and do not go nearly far enough, while others see them as an
8.

9.

10.

See Sean D. Murphy, US-EU "Safe Harbor" Data Privacy Arrangement, 95 Am J Intl L 156, 156
(2001) ("[I]n recognition of the ease with which personal data on Europeans can be transferred
electronically outside the EU, the directive sought to prohibit transfers to non-EU states unless
those states provide an 'adequate' level of data protection:).
See European Commission, Commission Decision pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Provisions and related Frequently Asked Questions issued by the US Department
of Commerce, available online at
<htrp://europa.eu.int/comm/internaLmarket/en/media/dataprot/news/decision.pdf>
(visited Mar 24,2002).
See Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Issuance of Safe Harbor
Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed Reg 45666 (2000) (modified in part

by 65 Fed Reg 56534 (2000)).
11.

12.

See Department of Commerce, Press Release, Commerce Under Secretary LaRussa Announces
Implementation of the Safe Harbor(Nov 1, 2000), available online at
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/media/CommerceNews/harborlll.html> (visited Mar 24,2002).
See, for example, Barbara Crutchfield George, Patricia Lynch, and Susan F. Marsnik, U.S.
Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the 'Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU Data
Privacy Directive,38 Am Bus LJ 735 (2001).
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intolerable European incursion into sovereignty and autonomy. Those who say the
principles are inadequate focus on the self-certification process, and the lack of
meaningful monitoring and implementation processes. 3 Those who say the
provisions go too far argue that they are detrimental to both international trade and
the economy.'4
The data-flow restrictions are also subject to a more philosophical challenge: that
they surrender to what is arguably Europe's overstepping of its sovereign reach. This
position suggests that Europe has surpassed its defensible global purview and
authority by demanding implementation of European-style protections, holding
hostage data flows to create a palpable threat. The remainder of this article addresses
these philosophical issues of international policy and law. In a global, high-technology
economy, in which boundaries are becoming ever more surmountable, how can and
should nations and regions protect their interests and manage inevitable spillover
effects?"
II.

MANAGING LOCAL OR REGIONAL INTERESTS IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY

The global privacy debate is significant for more than the substantive issues it has
identified. It also raises critical questions in regard to international relations, as areas
or regions try to meet their goals in regard to a technology that has little respect for
borders.
Through the EU's ambitious, wide-reaching strategy, privacy has become the
most prominent area of Internet regulation in which one region has tried very
aggressively to manage spillover effects by exerting substantial market pressure outside
its borders. The data-flow restrictions are not ambiguous: either a nation
demonstrates to the EU that it can ensure adequate levels of privacy protection, or it
6
loses access to personal data from the EU.'

13.

14.

15.

See Jennifer DiSabatino and Greg Stedman, US/Europe Privacy Deal Sent Back for More Talks;
European ParliamentRejects Proposal; Safe Harbor Agreement in Question, Computer World 24 (July 17,
2000) (noting the European Parliament's belief that the Safe Harbor Principles lack the
establishment of an independent body to hear complaints about incursions on privacy, as well as a
mechanism for private damages for those whose privacy has been invaded).
See Stan Beer, US Marketer Attacks EU Privacy Code, Austl Fin Rev 23 (Aug 8, 1998) (calling the EU
regulations "excessive" and extending "beyond consumer concern," and suggesting they could hurt
international trade and the economy).
See David G. Post and David R. Johnson, The New Civic Virtue of the Net: Lessons from Models of
Complex Systems for tbe Governance of Cyberspace, Stan Tech L Rev para 21 (1997), available online at

<htrp://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Working-Papers/97.Post-1/index.hrm> (visited Mar 24, 2002)

16.

(defining spillover effects as "effects of conduct [that] extend beyond pre-established geographical
boundaries-or 'spill over' into otherjurisdictions").
See Directive at art 25 § 1 (cited in note 1).
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The threat is enormous. For example, a multinational firm based in the US
could lose access to personal financial data. Were this to happen, banking across
borders could be paralyzed. Likewise, an airline selling a round-trip ticket between
Paris and New York could find itself unable to transmit the itinerary from France to
computer systems at Kennedy Airport. A company making personnel decisions or
assessments may find that employee records cannot be transmitted from Brussels to
Los Angeles. Assuming that the threat is serious-in other words, that the EU
actually will implement data flow restrictions against non-complying non-EU
nations-the stakes in ignoring the Directive are daunting.
Because the data-flow restrictions are potentially so harmful not only to thirdparty nation economies, but also to Europe's economy itself, one has to wonder
whether the risk of noncompliance is really significant. Had the US ignored the
threat, would the EU have carried it out? The costs of doing so to Europe would be
so enormous that it is hard to believe Europe would actually exercise the data-flow
provisions of Article 25. It is also questionable whether the EU will enforce the threat
against other significant trading partners in the future, should those partners fail to
develop acceptable Safe Harbor principles.
Whether a true threat or a bluff, the EU's approach in the Directive is one
specific example of a more general contemporary problem regarding Internet
regulation. Given its unprecedented globe-spanning capabilities,' 7 the Internet creates
new regulatory challenges for sovereign entities. Technology creates a world where
municipalities, states, nations, and even regional affiliations of nations are arguably too
small to address contemporary social interaction.
A likely future scenario is as follows: nations will recognize the new challenges of
Internet technology, and will search for ways to control new risks, sometimes within
the framework of regulation and legislation. To do this effectively, they must
acknowledge the degree to which spillover effects can undermine regulatory efforts.
Europe certainly did so in the area of privacy, and there is no doubt that the EU was
justified in its belief that failure to control the use of data outside Europe would
destroy the protections it was creating for its citizens. It is one thing to protect data
privacy and integrity within the borders of the fifteen EU nations; it is another thing
entirely to control what happens to information after it leaves the jurisdiction of EU
nation borders.
What is clear is that nations cannot effectively manage Internet behavior without
somehow controlling activities outside their own boundaries. What remains to be
answered, however, is how nations, or regions such as the EU, should try to manage
spillover effects fairly, effectively, and optimally. Is it appropriate to hold other
17.

See Julian Randall and Bridget Treacy, Digital Buccaneers Caught in a Legal Web, Fin Times 2 (May
30, 2000) (discussing a number of areas in which the Internet evokes concerns for businesspersons
regarding legal conflicts across countries of the world).
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nations and regions hostage to one's own regulatory scheme, as Europe arguably has
done and is doing in regard to its Data Privacy Directive? What will be the possible
costs of this method of managing spillover effects? And will this method even be
feasible in a pluralistic world with hundreds of nations? What will be the result of
this method-is it more likely to spur rapid unification of regulatory schemes, or to
spur international disharmony?
The remainder of this article makes the following arguments, in Sections III
through VI. First, aggressive management of spillovers will be essential if nations are
to pass effective consumer protection laws and regulations, not only in the realm of
privacy, but in other areas as well. Second, there may be some advantages in managing
spillovers multilaterally, as opposed to unilaterally. Third, the need for effective
spillover management in a technologically globalized world may favor unilateralism
over multilateralism. Finally, aggressive spillover management, while potentially
effective, is also risky. To the extent that sufficient groundwork in the form of aligned
values is lacking, aggressive approaches run the risk of encouraging international
dissension and tension.
III. THE NECESSITY OF AGGRESSIVE MANAGEMENT OF SPILLOVERS
The global privacy debate has demonstrated a fundamental problem with
Internet regulation and control: the problem of spillovers. I use the term "spillovers"
to refer to instances where control of behaviors in one sovereignty is affected by
behaviors from outside that sovereignty. This conceptualization comes from Post and
Johnson, who define spillovers as "effects of conduct [that] extend beyond
pre8
established geographical boundaries-or 'spill over' into other jurisdictions."
In the instance of data privacy protections, the outside activity spills into the
controlling state, and affects, often negatively, that state's ability to achieve its goals.
Thus, if control of privacy invasions in the European Union can be undermined by
behaviors in the United States, those US behaviors have a spillover effect in Europe.
Aggressive management of spillovers will be essential if nations are to pass effective
laws and regulations, not only in consumer privacy but in other areas as well.
While this problem certainly is not new, it takes on unprecedented importance
in the era of high technology. Spillovers threaten regulatory effectiveness so forcefully
in a wired world because wiring facilitates cross-border activities and cross-border
effects of conduct. For example, five hundred years ago, activities in Spain certainly
affected people who had their own governance structures in the Americas, but those
activities were highly constrained-indeed, interaction occurred only via transatlantic
ship travel. By the nineteenth century, technologies like telegraphy and telephony
fostered increased interaction among physically distant parties, so that spillover effects
18.

Post and Johnson, Stan Tech L Rev at para 21 (cited in note 15).
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became more common. Nations had to be more concerned about whether
extraterritorial activity would undermine the control mechanisms adopted through
their legal systems.
This trend continued into the twentieth century as new technologies continued
to shrink the world. Airplanes, cheaper international telephone technologies,
overnight mail, and other innovations made the corners of the globe more accessible,
permitting more transnational interaction, hence creating more spillover effects. No
previous innovation, however, has come close to interactive computer technology in
terms of its exponential magnification of spillover threats.
Clearly, the EU's efforts to limit the use of personal information would be
seriously undermined if they were to disappear at the fifteen member nations' borders.
Without effective controls of personal data use abroad, all the abuses that the EU
seeks to avert simply would be shifted. Whatever one ultimately thinks of the EU's
aggressive approach, one must at least understand its motivation and sympathize with
the difficulties of achieving effective Internet governance in todays global arena.
Moreover, at first blush, the EU's approach to privacy protection appears to be at
least somewhat effective. By being an early and aggressive entrant, Europe has set the
terms of the debate and, in the process, has identified itself as exercising leadership in
the area of data privacy protection. Other countries indeed appear to be moving
toward Europe's groundbreaking model for privacy protection."
Still, despite its unquestionable influence, the Directive will impose major costs
around the world. These costs come in numerous forms. Relatively pedestrian are
the localized costs to third-nation governments and businesses in forging Safe Harbor
compliance systems and the organizational changes that will be necessary to
implement them. Of greater concern are the potential costs in international goodwill,
should non-EU nations resent the domineering approach taken under the Directive.
Barbara Crutchfield George and others have observed that the EU's approach
has been "unsettling," noting that "the EU in effect is dictating to [businesses] ... how
to run their companies." Some politicians apparently agree with this assessment. In
March 2001, Representative Billy Tauzin of Louisiana, House Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman, joined other members of the House in attacking the Privacy
Directive.2 ' He suggested that Europe is foisting a global privacy standard on the rest
of the world, erroneously assuming that, where privacy is concerned, one size fits all.'
19.

20.
21.

22.

See Marie Clear, Falling Into the Gap: The European Union's Data Protection Act and Its Impact on U.S.
Law and Commerce, 18 John Marshall J Computer & Info L 981, 1016 (2000) (noting that some
countries are responding to the EU Data Privacy Directive by "moving to adopt the European
standards outright").
George, Lynch, and Marsnik, 38 Am Bus LJ at 781-782 (cited in note 12).
See Marilyn Geewax, Key Congressman Says European Rules on Net Privacy Could Hurt U.S. Commerce,
ArIJ & Consr C5 (Mar 9,2001).

Id.
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The level of discomfort in the US may be exacerbated by the difficulty we may

have in accepting the EU/US role reversal inherent in the Safe Harbor Provisions of
the Directive. 23 This change reflects a broader shift in the balance of power between

Europe and the US, as a function of increased contemporary European unity.24
The US has taken seriously the Directive's threat to transnational information
flows.2 The Directive certainly did engender heated debate and protest by US
companies.
One reporter described the reaction in early 1999 as a "furious
counterattack from American companies that fear the EU measure could slow the

transatlantic growth of electronic commerce."'

Yet while the Directive's aggressive

management of externalities seems to be working, at least on paper, there may be costs
in terms of international dissension and friction. These will be addressed in more

detail later.
IV.

MULTILATERAL ALTERNATIVES

Some suggest that unilateral action is not the best approach to the development

of a unified, global policy for the management of global technology issues. Julia
Fromholz contends, for example, that
[u]nilateral action, such as the implementation of the EU Directive, will only stir
international resentment. Only if a wide array of nations, possibly acting through a
body such as the WTO or the United Nations, arrives at an agreement on the
appropriate level of data protection will a truly global solution be possible.

Fromholz's concern about the impact of unilateral regulatory solutions on
international relations certainly is legitimate. Any time one nation or group of nations
tries to impose its own rules and order on others, disagreements can ensue, tensions
can mount, and resentments can develop and grow.'8 A question that remains is

23.
24.

25.

26.
27.
28.

See George, Lynch, and Marsnik, 38 Am Bus LJ at 782 (cited in note 12).
Id at 782-783. The authors state,
Without a united European contingent of fifteen Member States, it was much easier for
the United States to use its strength with individual nation-states. Any attempt of one of
the European nations to impose an extraterritorial effect on data transfers would either
never have occurred or, if it did, would not have been considered a serious threat. The
overall lesson that multinational employers and those engaged in international business
transactions may learn from the current data protection controversy with the EU is that
an increasingly integrated Europe brings with it the specter of an increasing intrusion in
U.S. business policies.
See, for example, Brandon Mitchener and Julie Wolf, EU Notebook: A Special Background Report on
European Union Business and Politics, Wall St J Eur 1 (Jan 28, 1999) (quoting David Aaron, US
Undersecretary of Commerce, as saying that the Directive "is an important priority for the
Administration and the U.S. business community, and high stakes are involved").
Louis Jacobson, A Trans-Atlantic TiffOver Privacy, NatlJ 348 (Feb 6, 1999).
Julia M. Fromholz, The EuropeanData Privacy Directive,15 Berkeley Tech L J461, 483 (2000).
See Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign CorruptPractices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 Mich J Intl L
419 (1999) (suggesting that extraterritorial application of anti-bribery legislation bears similar risks
to those to which Fromholz alludes).

c1013 NO.1

'Rjeufation of '3orderless4g-Tecbmnofog 8onomiesSau

Saffu

whether Fromholz's alternative-multilateral negotiation of, forging of, and
agreement on appropriate solutions to global privacy challenges-will work.
The growing influence of non-governmental organizations ('NGOs") in the
global arena' suggests that multilateral negotiation has a potential role to play in the
process of managing international spillover effects associated with technological global
integration.
Whether this growing role of NGOs and intergovernmental
organizations ("IGOs") turns out to be a positive or negative force, the phenomenon is
a present reality, and likely will continue to develop along with contemporary
information technologies.
Jessica Mathews goes so far as to call the
telecommunications revolution "[t]he most powerful engine of change in the relative
decline of states and the rise of non-state actors.
Diffusion of information
technology has eroded governmental power bases, as the ability to collect and manage
information has spread to ordinary people and less established institutions and
organizations.3 This in turn "multiplies the number of players who matter and
reduces the number who command great authority.
In this information age, it is
hardly surprising then that NGOs and IGOs have made substantial gains in
influence.
Of course, while the EU itself can be seen as one kind of IGO and therefore
multilateral, Frohmolz's characterization of both the EU and its Data Privacy
Directive as essentially unilateral is accurate. There are broader, more inclusive, less
regionally defined alternatives that are truly multilateral. These are likely to provide
some advantages over IGOs that are defined geographically, and therefore are subject
to some of the same limitations as geographically defined traditional sovereign
nations. In other words, even if we technically consider the EU to be an IGO, it is
hardly one that embodies the spirit of multilateralism. It is more accurate to cast the
EU as a regional alliance intended to create benefits for its members, in part by
increasing Europe's relative global power. While the EU is not one nation, it serves
some of the unabashedly self-interested goals that are traditionally sought by single
nations.
Potential alternative examples that are not so regionally constrained, and
therefore are potentially more multilateral in scope, are the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), and the United Nations. Of course, just as regional governmental
alliances, such as the EU, are imperfect providers of global policy, so too do these
alternative alliances have advantages and disadvantages. One possible benefit of such

29.

See Karsten Nowror, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations

30.
31.
32.

Under InternationalLaw, 6 IndJ Global Legal Stud 579, 579-80 (1999).
Jessica T. Mathews, Power Sbift,
76 Foreign Aff 50,51 (1997).
See id at 51.
Id.
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NGOs and IGOs as international policy forgers is the role they can play as
accumulators and managers of knowledge and information. Ryan and others posit
this role as follows:
Buildin upon the functional theory of international governmental organizations
("IGOs') and drawing from the organizational theory of knowledge management,
we conceptualize IGOs as knowledge managers, organizations with the capabilities
to support multilateral trade and economic lawmaking processes. States create
IGOs to further their wealth of knowledge; IGOs transfer information better than
global markets. Moreover, states create IGOs to accumulate and disseminate
owledge, and thereby reduce international transaction costs.
IGOs are essentially "learners," as they acquire new information in order to be
Each IGO possesses distinctive domains of
disseminators of knowledge.
knowledge, including strengths and weaknesses with respect to institutional
capabilities. The knowledge accumulation and management of the IGO is central
to the shared-knowledge of an international regime, thereby making the IGO the
crucial cooperation-facilitating institution in a given area of international relations.
We present an analytic framework for the investigation of IGO capabilities and
capacities as knowledge managers in future international trade and trade-related
law-making negotiations."
Again, while NGOs and IGOs have a potential role to play, they also have
potential limitations. For example, while the OECD is an influential organization
with the power and resources to champion global policy, in some ways it is no less
parochial than the EU. Whereas the EU's limited purview is a function of its
regionalism, the OECD's limitations derive from its status as what James Salzman
calls a "Rich Man's Club."" This label refers to the fact that the members of the
OECD are wealthy, industrialized nations whose perspective is limited." Potential
flaws are exacerbated by what some purport to be a lack of openness and transparency
of OECD meetings, 36 which raises potential questions regarding accountability. The
WTO recently has been subject to similar criticism, in some ways more severe than
challenges lodged against the OECD. Demonstrations at the 1999 Third Ministerial
Meeting in Seattle reflected beliefs that WTO decisionmaking on trade and
environmental policy is non-democratic, lacking both legitimacy and accountability. 7

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Michael P. Ryan, W. Christopher Lenhardt, and Katsuya Tamai, International Governmental
Organization Knowledge Management for Multilateral Trade Lawmaking, 15 Am U Intl L Rev 1347,
1348-49 (2000) (citations omitted).
James Salzman, Labor Rights, Globalization and Institutions: The Role and Influence of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, 21 MichJ Intl L 769,776 (2000).
See id at 776.
See id at 776-77.
See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and
Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 1-2 (2001)
(noting that the central claim of the US environmental groups which formed "a core part of the
protests" was that "VTO decisions on trade and environment issues are anti-democratic and thus
lack legitimacy").
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The United Nations arguably brings a converse bias to its proceedings, under
perceptions that the organization is "developing country dominated and politicized."
Prominent alliances that are not dominated by either developed or developing nations
appear to be in short supply. Moreover, NGOs and IGOs tend to be bifurcated into
another set of constraining classes-political versus economic. Whereas the United
Nations tends to focus on "the politics of peace," the World Bank focuses on
macroeconomic dynamics. 9 Although both organizations work toward global
coordination and conflict resolution, each tends to do so from a specialized vantage.
While specialization by two of the world's most powerful alliances may bear benefits
of expertise and focus, they also bear potential costs, in the form of limited scope.
Globalized challenges like world privacy demand attention to all pertinent
dimensions-political, social, and economic.
To address Internet challenges like privacy, with their substantial spillover
effects, we may need more overarching NGO or IGO activity. This could be in the
form of extant organizations expanding their focus, or the creation of new
organizations having broader focus, or the collaboration of existing organizations to
cover all relevant dimensions. An advantage of the third option is that collaboration
would allow the participating organizations to maintain the benefits of their own
specializations, while overcoming parochialism through the joining of forces.
These observations suggest that there presently is no ideal (or even close to ideal)
organization with which to entrust multilateral negotiation of global high-tech privacy
issues. This dearth is likely to apply to NGOs and IGOs alike. Within this reality,
and given the exigency of political, social, and economic challenges arising from the
ever-changing Internet, unilateralism has a substantial appeal. Whatever its
downside, the Directive has moved relatively quickly, reducing the risk that
deliberations will outlast the poignancy of the issues they are intended to address.

V. HOW

THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE SPILLOVER MANAGEMENT IN A
TECHNOLOGICALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD MAY FAVOR
UNILATERALISM OVER MULTILATERALISM

Spillover management is more than an assurance of legal efficacy; it is also a
driving force that presses regulation to catch up with technological globalization. This
pressure is likely to favor unilateral approaches, such as the EU Data Privacy
Directive, over more multilateral efforts.

38.

Salzman, 21 Mich J Intl L at 777 (cited in note 34).

39.

See Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K Jacobson, and Allan Gerson, PeaceBuilding The PrivateSector's Role,
95 AmI Intl L 102,102 (2001).
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To understand this proposition, it helps to begin by defining globalization, and
then explaining the phrase "technological globalization." These definitions are
especially important because they often mean different things to different people."
"Globalization" is a term fraught with the potential for creating conflict partly
because different groups perceive it so differently. Western businesspersons may not
see globalization in the same way as environmentalists or developing nation activists,
for example. Duffield succinctly captures what he calls "the paradox of globalization":
The term globalization has a number of different and even conflicting meanings.
Within the international financial institutions (IFIs) and among free-market
economists, for example, globalization is largely understood in terms of a worldwide economic and political convergence around liberal market principles and the
increasing real-time integration of business, technological and financial systems.
Based on an expansion and deepening of market competition, globalization is
synonymous with an irresistible process of economic, political and cultural change
that is sweeping all national boundaries and protectionist tendencies before it.
Indeed, for a countr to remain outside this process is now tantamount to its
marginalization and failure. This pervasive neo-liberal assumption has been dubbed
"hyperglobalization."
However, while accepting that the current phase of globalization represents a new
departure, there is a political economy position that contradicts the optimism that
usually accompanies globalization's free market interpretation. That is, the forces of
globalization often produce unexpected and unwanted outcomes as they encounter
other social systems. Rather than the anticipated virtuous circles of growth and
prosperity that lead to orderliness, globalization tends to encourage new and
durable forms of division, inequality and instability.
As I use the term here, globalization refers to the "inexorable integration of
markets, nation-states and technologies driven by free-market capitalism and having a
widespread homogenizing effect on cultures."42 Modern driving forces of globalization
include space exploration, the development of satellites, the development of nuclear
energy, borderless environmental influences, and the political and economic hegemony
of the multinational corporation."
Globalization today is facilitated by regional economic alliances like the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union.' Globalization increases
the number of relationships among nation-states and people the world over, as well as
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Christopher W. Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty, and Migration: A Conceptual Framework, 3
UCLAJ Intl L & Foreign Aff 325, 328 (1998-99).
See Mark Duffield, Globalization and War Economies: Promoting Order or the Return of History?, 23
Fletcher F World Aff 21, 22 (1999) (citation omitted).
Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism:The Court's Answer to Globalization, 95 Nw U L Rev
735, 735 (2001) (quoting journalist Thomas Friedman).
See Bruce Mazlish, A Tour of Globalization, 7 IndJ Global Legal Stud 5, 5-6 (1999).
See David M. Trubek, Jim Mosher, and Jeffrey S. Rothstein, Transnationalism in the Regulation of
Labor Relations: InternationalRegimes and TransnationalAdvocacy Networks, 25 Law & Soc Inquiry 1187,
1188 (2000) ("Integration may come about through public policy, as in the case of regional economic
schemes like the European Union (EU) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).").
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the degree of connectedness that characterizes these relationships." These phenomena
spur a concomitant demand for global integration of laws" capable of maintaining
order in this rapidly changing global environment.
I use the term "technological globalization" to refer to a subclass of globalization
that is important not only because it can be analyzed as a refined category, but also
because this aspect of globalization is the driving force behind the unprecedented
speed of globalization in general. Modern media that support the storage and
exchange of information are having a profound effect on global society and politics.
A good metaphor to distinguish technological globalization from the broader category
of generic globalization is the Internet phenomenon of e-mail. International snail mail
certainly has enhanced generic globalization by serving as one of numerous ways in
which people can interact and communicate across the globe. Recently, e-mail has
enhanced the more specific end of technological globalization by supporting such
interaction and communication in a manner that is virtually instantaneous. This
temporal leap is also a quantum leap in its social and economic effects, and therefore
in the challenges posed to legal systems aimed at monitoring and controlling such
effects.
Because it is characterized by dramatic acceleration over generic globalization,
technological globalization makes daunting demands on legal and regulatory systems.
As the Internet magnifies the speed and quantity of potential international
transactions exponentially, the stakes in creating a global governance structure
likewise increase dramatically. Within this context, aggressive unilateral spillover
management drives regulation to catch up with the remarkable pace of technological
globalization. The process is cyclical and self-reinforcing. Technological globalization
increases the stakes in addressing Internet control issues globally and consistently, and
doing so quickly. These increased stakes are the impetus for aggressive spillover
management efforts. Because the effects and implications of spillover are greatly
magnified by technological globalization, nations and regions have a growing
imperative to address them effectively. Because the problems and challenges of the
Internet change more rapidly than ever, there is also a growing imperative to address
spillover effects quickly, in order to ensure that domestic protections are not lost or
damaged abroad. This combined pressure for effective, fast answers confers upon
aggressive, unilateral regulatory approaches a serious competitive advantage over more
deliberative, time-consuming multilateral processes.

45.

See Kim Rubenstein and Daniel Adler, International Citizenship: The Future of Nationality in a
Globalized World, 7 IndJ Global Legal Stud 519, 526 (2000).

46.

See Knowles, 95 Nw U L Rev at 735 (cited in note 42).

47.

See generally Ronald J. Deibert, Parcbment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order
Transformation (Columbia 1997).
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If an Internet policy is to have value, it indeed must be both effective and timely.
By the time a slow response is created, the challenges of the Internet are likely to have
morphed into something new, so that slow responses are unlikely to be effective. The
second part of the cycle is fulfilled when timely, effective, unilaterally forged laws meet
the social and economic needs of our wired world, thereby supporting both the
infrastructure and the transactions that occur within it. A strong, effective
technological society then can strive to respond to even more demanding new legal
and regulatory challenges, which again will demand even more rapid responses that
effectively address a wide array of global issues.
One very important final observation: this reasoning presumes that unilaterally
forged laws, regulations, and policies can be effective, and that there are no serious
impediments to that effectiveness. This may be far from true. Indeed, multilateral
approaches have serious advantages in this regard because they incorporate
constituent inputs that may be necessary or helpful in creating effective responses. In
other words, the speed that is so crucial in addressing contemporary challenges works
against effectiveness in many ways. Speed can come at a price, including insufficient
groundwork, careless analysis, and failure to muster necessary consensus. If
unilateralism is to achieve its potential advantages in managing global spillover effects,
it must be built on some level of fundamental legitimacy, including a foundation of
global value consensus. The world might not yet be ready for the unilateral answers
that one day could be optimal. This issue and related issues are addressed in more
detail in the following final section.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE RISKS OF AGGRESSIVE SPILLOVER
MANAGEMENT WHEN VALUE SYSTEMS ARE INSUFFICIENTLY

ALIGNED

While potentially effective, aggressive spillover management is also risky. In the
absence of sufficient groundwork, in the form of acceptable procedures and
sufficiently aligned value systems, aggressive approaches run the risk of increasing
international dissension and tension.
This risk is a function of two factors that I will label substantive friction and
procedural friction. These are examined individually in the subsections below.
A. SUBSTANTIVE FRICTION
The term "substantive friction" here refers to difficulties created when the terms
of laws or policies are alien to a group upon whom they are imposed. In the case of
data privacy, the more Europe's values differ from the values of other regions, the
more the Directive's threat to data flows will be resented in those regions. Conversely,
the greater the global concurrence regarding fundamental privacy rights, the less
officious one region's efforts to organize common beliefs into law and public policy
will seem. In terms of international relations, the Directive is likely to be well
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received, and to appear as a form of leadership, if it builds on a solid foundation of
preexisting community values. This perception of leadership gradually deteriorates
into perceptions of overreaching, bullying, and aggression the more third-party
nations disagree with the fundamental philosophy behind the Directive.
This is certainly a real risk in regard to the EU's data-flow restrictions. At first
glance, data privacy seems fairly straightforward and not very controversial. But
consider just one of many possible objections, rooted in fundamental cultural
differences: that aggressive data privacy protections undermine a countervailing "right
to know." Nowhere is this latter right taken more seriously than in the United States.
Our First Amendment speech protections reflect the very strong values we place on
discourse, knowledge, and exchange of ideas. Central to these objects is a profound
belief in the value of information-a belief that, if anything, has grown rather than
diminished in the age of the computer. One person's privacy diminishes another
person's right to know, and vice versa. Neither right would ever be considered
absolute by anyone save extremists. Nonetheless, the US and Europe are quite far
apart in the relative weights they assign to these two conflicting rights. Not
surprisingly, Americans often shrug away suggestions that they should be concerned
about marketers' use of data-indeed, how many of us even bother to opt out of such
processes? This scenario is very dissimilar to Directive opt-in provisions for European
consumers. US business interests have a lot to lose when the EU Data Privacy
Directive asks for fundamental changes in the ease with which marketing data can be
garnered, sold, and used. Substantive friction is likely to be considerable in this
context.
B.

PROCEDURAL FRICTION

Even when substantive friction is minimal, the procedures through which an
otherwise acceptable law or policy is created and imposed can cause conflict. I use the
term "procedural friction" to refer to this form of conflict. Of course, both forms of
friction can exist simultaneously as well, and the values of two cultures would have to
be remarkably well aligned for procedural friction to exist entirely in the absence of
substantive friction.
Nonetheless, let us assume for a moment an instance where that is precisely the
case: an external sovereign authority is imposing its will on actors in other
sovereignties, but the provisions and terms of the imposed will are perfectly
compatible with the cultures upon which they are imposed. There is nonetheless a
problem: potential resentment, even hostility, over presumptions, attitudes, and power
relations.
Some may see aggressive national or regional stances as presumptuous. They
may then interpret the perceived overstepping as anything from a breach of etiquette
to a serious absence of protocol. Where in this spectrum a particular aggressive act
falls can be a function of things like prior general relations between two countries or
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regional alliances, and specific antecedents in the form of previous presumptive stances
related to other international policy issues.
An aggressive international policy stance also can communicate attitudes, both
toward the rest of the world generally, and toward regions or nations specifically. For
example, a domineering leadership position can suggest attitudes of superiority. The
subtext in this instance is, "We are better than you, therefore our solution to this
policy problem will be superior to any that you might devise." Likewise, forceful
initiative can suggest attitudes of patronization, where the message perceived is,
"Someone needs to take care of the rest of the world, or particular nations or regions
specifically, and we must step up to the challenge in your own best interests."
Needless to say, these two examples of superiority and patronization would likely
engender resentment from those on the receiving end. It bears reiterating here that
the issue of attitude communication in regard to international relations concerns the
perceptions of the receiver of the message, even if the sender of the message is entirely
innocent of received slights or offenses. Even the most innocent of policy leaders can
find its policies a source of hostility if the message received is not the one they
intended to convey.
Finally, aggressive leadership in setting global policies is likely to carry messages
regarding power relations. In one sense, a nation's or region's mere decision to take
such a leadership role is tantamount to the unilateral accession of authority, and the
unilateral pronouncement that the nation or region believes it has the force to carry
out its mission. Otherwise, the mission would be a fool's errand, and even if a nation
or region does not have the power implicit in the move it is taking it probably believes
it has the power and is not reticent to announce to the world that it has the power.
The receiving end of one region's power is other regions' submission-this is a
scenario custom-made to engender fear, suspicion, and attempts to rectify the power
imbalance.
Do these risks then mean that a regional alliance like the EU should not act as it
has in taking a leadership position in the area of data privacy protection? Not
necessarily. I have used the phrase "aggressive leadership" in this article. I chose a
term intentionally ambiguous in that it doesn't clearly suggest a posture that is good
or bad. Leadership is generally viewed as a positive quality; aggression, at least in the
context of international relations, is generally considered a negative one. Whether the
good associated with leadership trumps the bad associated with aggression will be a
function of context. And assessing context will be a delicate matter.
I have already suggested that one critical variable is the degree to which global
participants have already converged onto an arena of common ground. The stronger
the foundation of globally shared norms, values, and beliefs, the more likely the
posture will be viewed predominantly for its leadership attributes instead of its
aggressive approach. This makes sense intuitively, and it can also be explained in
terms of community.
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One way a well functioning community can be defined is in terms of shared
norms, values, and beliefs. The greater the global convergence in these areas, the
stronger the sense that a world community exists. In this context, the nation or region
that takes a leadership position is seen less as an outsider, and more as a community
member that has undertaken a difficult task in the interest of that community.
Where does this leave us? We already have seen that technology demands fast,
effective spillover management, which certainly can be provided by an effective (and
implicitly unilateral) leader. Extant multilateral entities such as the WTO and
United Nations may be both too parochial and too unwieldy to meet these speed
requirements. Indeed, this may explain why the EU has taken a leadership role in
addressing data privacy around the world. However, the risks of unilateralism,
including global friction, resentment, and hostility will only begin to decrease as we
move closer to building a true global village.
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